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Making the Redefining
Homeless Homelessness
Disappear in Massachusetts
Sue Marsh
While unemployment rocked Massachusetts, housing costs remained at record levels,
and the federal government continued its inattention to housing and human service pro-
grams, the numbers ofhomeless families sheltered by the commonwealth ofMassachusetts
declined. This article examines the changes over the last decade in the way Massachusetts
provides shelter to homelessfamilies. What has in fact changedfor homeless families, Marsh
contends, is whether the state ofMassachusetts considers them homeless. An increasingly
complicated and burdensome set ofrules has become a highly effective gatekeeper that keeps
the commonwealth's shelter expenditures down and homelessfamilies out.
Counting the homeless has served a variety of functions for the past decade.
Indeed, the politics of counting are so complex, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) Annual Housing Conference of 1991 dealt exclusively with
the issue, inviting a range of scholars, policymakers, and advocates to write and speak
about this topic. The controversial aspects of counting cropped up again in the con-
text of the 1990 census, as officials and homeless advocates contested one another's
methodologies, premises, and results. Indeed, census taking has become as essential
a part of homelessness policy as shelter, affordable housing development, and ser-
vice delivery.
A key difficulty in counting homeless people is the very nature of their circum-
stances. Homeless persons are transient— they lack a permanent place to live. "A
count of the homeless always reflects only those who have been observed, identified,
or otherwise estimated. But a hidden population [such as the homeless], by definition,
also contains members who remain uncounted and unknown." 1 Clouding the accuracy
of such counts are, at a minimum, issues of definition, of timing, and of accessibility.
Who "counts" as a homeless person varies according to perspective. During a
Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless (MCH) 2 campaign to create a preference
for homeless persons for state housing resources, a group of housing and redevelop-
ment officials offered the position that only those without shelter ofany kind should
be considered homeless. 3 This position precludes even those living in cars from
Sue Marsh is the executive director of the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless.
511
New England Journal ofPublic Policy
being defined as homeless. (Commonwealth officials rejected this argument.) Most
frequently, it is the decision to include households living in overcrowded and sub-
standard conditions as homeless that sparks disagreement. Anna Kondratas, a staff
member of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, discounts
these groups as legitimately homeless4 and contends that only those found on the
streets or in emergency shelters should be so considered. Providers, legal aid attor-
neys, and advocates who work with households in these circumstances assert, how-
ever, that given the tenuous living conditions in which these families live, they are
rightly considered without safe and secure housing. In any event, the lack of con-
sensus— even in terms of defining whom to count— makes surveys that much
more difficult.
Homeless families and individuals are without housing for various lengths of time.
In Massachusetts, the average length of homelessness for families has ranged from
sixty days (in 1990) to the current five to six months. For individuals, homelessness
tends to be a longer-term event, primarily because assistance in housing search and
provision of housing resources are even less available than they are to parents with
children. In any event, the time period of the count— a one-night snapshot, or an
unduplicated count over the course of a year— affects the result.
Finally, the ability of the counters to make contact with homeless families and
individuals ranges from difficult to impossible. Families illegally doubled up with
other families do not willingly identify themselves. Homeless people in hospitals,
jails, condemned buildings, and other institutions are unlikely to be recognized as
homeless. For many homeless people, the goal is to not to be identified as such, for
reasons of safety, security, dignity. While the unwillingness to be seen as homeless
often coincides with official unwillingness to see homelessness, the end result is an
unknowable number of homeless people.
Shelter Provision as a Benchmark
In Massachusetts, counts by localities and the commonwealth have been attempted
through "streets count" surveys of providers. The city of Boston's Emergency Shel-
ter Commission, in particular, has been exceptionally straightforward in acknowl-
edging the limits of such a count and cautious in applying the resulting numbers to
formulate policy. Generally, Massachusetts officials, providers, and advocates have
focused on other measures of need, progress, and accomplishment in assessing
homeless policymaking: examples include the numbers of persons served by a partic-
ular program and number of requests for service. Such counts have served as mea-
sures in claiming progress— or lack of it— in ending homelessness.
The number of persons sheltered by the commonwealth has served as the funda-
mental measure for both the state's and advocates' evaluation of progress in combat-
ing and preventing homelessness. Indeed, when he was elected, Governor William
Weld indicated that he would use this measure as an indicator of the success or fail-
ure of his cuts in human service programs: "If the homeless shelters are absolutely
overflowing come October 1, that will tell us something"5 While there is argument
between advocates and officials about shelters as the ultimate measure of the success
or failure of governmental policies (and the appropriateness of gauging whether a
bad policy decision has been made in visiting the ultimate kind of devastation, home-
lessness, upon affected persons!), emergency shelter use can be a fair indicator, as
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long as those in need have ready access to such resources. It certainly tells us some-
thing if the number of homeless sheltered by the state goes up or down— and state
officials have grown increasingly invested in having the numbers decline— in telling
us that homelessness is disappearing.
Massachusetts's stake in providing emergency shelter to homeless people began
with Governor Michael Dukakis's 1983 inaugural speech.
Thousands of homeless wander our streets without permanent shelter. And we
mustprovide it . . . Tomorrow morning in my office I will convene an emergency
meeting of the new cabinet, the Senate president, and speaker of the House, non-
profit organizations, civic and religious leaders, and representatives of the Coali-
tion for the Homeless. We will begin immediately to put together a statewide effort
which will provide the necessities of life to those in desperate need. We will estab-
lish a toll-free hot line for instant referral, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. If needed, we will draw on surplus state hospitals, unused public schools,
and as a last resort, National Guard armories to shelter the homeless and to dis-
tribute surplus food.6 [Italics added]
Homeless families quickly became the focal point of the state's efforts in provid-
ing shelter, and it was not until years later that Executive Office of Human Services
Secretary Philip Johnston made the verbal commitment to provide emergency shelter
to every homeless individual in need. 7 Chapter 450 of the Massachusetts General
Laws, enacted by the legislature in the autumn of 1983, mandated that the common-
wealth provide "a program of emergency assistance to needy families with children
and pregnant women with no other children— [including] temporary shelter as nec-
essary to alleviate homelessness when such family has no feasible alternative housing
available, up to the maximum period subject to federal reimbursement." This program,
emergency assistance, has come to be known as EA.
With few family shelters, Massachusetts began to use state-paid hotels and motels
to absorb the overflow of homeless families who lacked emergency shelter. The
hotel census quickly became a volatile policy issue, with media, legislators, and advo-
cates pointing to the specter of (primarily) women with children subsisting in dilapi-
dated, expensive motels.
The motel rooms are crowded. One room serves as a living room, kitchen and
bedroom . . . Sickness spreads easily among children in cramped quarters . .
.
Cooking over a hot plate means quick meals with little nutritional value. Play-
grounds are parking lots . . . Children's education suffer as the family moves from
motel to motel. For parents, motel life is extremely stressful. 8
As horrifying as the physical circumstances of homeless families in emergency
shelters, however, state officials reacted even more strongly to the enormous cost of
sheltering them. In the same Globe article, motel manager George Anderson, who
received $51,000 per month from the Department of Public Welfare to shelter home-
less families, noted: "[The motel will be in the business of housing families on welfare
for a long time to come because] eight mothers and their kids left last month for
places of their own, but about eight new ones came right back in."
Where did the never-ending sources of homeless families come from? As the
Department of Public Welfare (DPW) indicated to the legislature in its annual
report, families receiving AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] benefits
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live on incomes far below the level needed to meet basic costs of living. In its fiscal
1990 report to the legislature, DPW said:
The problem of families at risk of becoming homeless is increasing, driven in
large part by a lack of affordable low income housing. A principal factor in this
shortage is the reduction of federal support for new low income housing. For
example, in FFY [federal fiscal year] 79 the federal government added 15,000
subsidized units to the Commonwealth's low income housing stock; by FFY87,
however new federal production has decreased to less than 2,000 units. 9
DPW further acknowledges that "AFDC benefit levels contribute to the prob-
lem." Indeed, with AFDC incomes far below the poverty line and only one third of
AFDC recipients living in public or subsidized housing, the combination of high
housing costs and low public assistance grants ensures that more than 60,000 fami-
lies will live continually at the edge— or over the edge— of homelessness.
For most welfare recipients, shelter costs represent the single largest category of
expenditure. In "Special Report: A Profile on Family Homelessness" by Dale Mitchell
and Ronna Bernstein of Meredith and Associates, the authors noted: "Virtually
every component of each [interviewed] family's shelter costs (rent, fuel and utilities)
was beyond their meager financial capabilities . . . Given the mismatch between
income and basic shelter costs, it should not be surprising to find that debt to shelter
vendors (landlords, utility companies and fuel deliverers) was routine fact of life for
those families." 10 Given these 1983 findings, the situation only worsened in the fol-
lowing years. Between 1982 and 1990, housing costs increased dramatically, while
welfare benefits lingered at levels of 30 to 40 percent below the federally established
poverty line. While AFDC 1970 benefits were at the poverty line (not a very gener-
ous standard, in any event), benefit levels eroded greatly due to inflation. Between
1970 and 1987, welfare benefits rose 65 percent, while the cost of living, as measured
by the Consumer Price Index, rose by 190 percent.
Table 1
AFDC Monthly Grants versus Monthly Two-bedroom
Apartment Rents
Year AFDC Grant for Family of Three Two-bedroom Apartment Rent
$455
$528
$711
$830
$857
Source: Department of Public Welfare, City of Boston.
Efforts to address the enormous gap between housing costs and poor families'
incomes throughout the 1980s were scattershot at best. As the Massachusetts econ-
omy boomed, housing prices were bid up by an oversupply of consumers and under-
supply of housing units. Meanwhile, most of the state's housing policies were
directed at moderate-income would-be homeowners, individuals with substantial
special needs (mental illness or mental retardation), and rental housing developers.
AFDC households received no special priority in obtaining what housing assistance
was offered by state or federal programs. Cost-of-living increases were provided, but
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1982 $356
1984 $375
1986 $427
1988 $510
1990 $579
not nearly of the magnitude required to enable AFDC households to cope with pri-
vate housing market costs. With one exception, described below, the state's efforts at
assisting AFDC families in retaining their housing focused on services— landlord-
tenant mediation, for example— rather than redressing the rent-income gap. By
failing to address the real cause of families' homelessness, as acknowledged in their
own reports to the legislature, the commonwealth ensured that its ability to substan-
tially reduce or end homelessness was blunted. With a goal of reducing the number
of families sheltered by the commonwealth and a lack of interest and will in pursuing
the economically based efforts (with their attendant financial and political costs) to
do so, the state became increasingly dependent on blocking access to shelter as a
way to show success.
In one instance, however, the commonwealth created and implemented a pro-
gram that exactly targeted the gap between homeless families' incomes and the cost
of private market housing. The Chapter 707 Rental Subsidy Program, based on the
federal Section 8 program, was used to great effect for several years to assist home-
less families in escaping shelter. While the Chapter 707-assisted family paid a
monthly rent equal to 25 percent of income, the commonwealth made up the differ-
ence between that amount and the capped amount charged by the private market
landlord. With the assistance of state-paid housing search workers, the common-
wealth soon found that with their rent-income gap addressed, homeless families were
able to leave emergency shelters for permanent, affordable housing quickly. The budget
cuts wrought by the last several years of the commonwealth's revenue problems,
however, have taken their toll on the Chapter 707 program: in fiscal 1990, the state
funded subsidies for two thousand homeless families; the following year, the number
was cut by 60 percent; for the next two fiscal years, no subsidies were funded.
Making the Homeless Disappear
Despite the fact that AFDC families' incomes continued at levels too low to make
housing affordable, the census count of homeless families sheltered by the state took
a dramatic nosedive in the late 1980s, a nosedive unrelated to federal funding of
Figure 1
Monthly Numbers of Homeless Families Sheltered by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
1260 --
1134 --
1008 --
882 --
756 --
630 --
504 --
378 --
252 --
126 --
--
Homeless Families 1/88 through 8/91
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Source: Created by Leslie Lawrence, Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, from data supplied by the
Department of Public Welfare.
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housing, grant levels, rents, or housing vacancy rates. Rather, the number of home-
less families sheltered by the state decreased as a result of the commonwealth's
manipulation of eligibility criteria.
Officials' interest in changing eligibility for shelter developed soon after their idea
of sheltering homeless families. An internal DPW memo to then Commissioner
Charles Atkins advised:
One of the most direct methods for the Department to decrease EA expenditures
is to limit the amount of benefits available . . . The Department could place more
stringent constraints on the circumstances which create eligibility for the EA pro-
gram . . . The Department could move towards a tighter definition of homeless-
ness, thus limiting the number of families eligible for homeless benefits.11
Atkins followed up on his staff's advice with a memo to his boss:
Emergency Assistance expenditures have grown recently at an alarming rate,
tripling in three years from $7.5 million in FY83 to $23.1 million ... It is essential
to manage eligibility for hotel benefits to curb the rapid growth in hotel/motel
expenditures. The Department proposes to implement an eligibility policy in
which only families with a demonstrable need for temporary shelter could receive
hotel/motel benefits. 12
The department entered into a series of discussions with advocates for the home-
less, in which DPW proposals to limit access were beaten back. Indeed, advocates
succeeded to the extent that the department, in October 1985, promulgated State
Letter 745. It specified that households eligible for shelter were those which were
"rendered homeless for any reason except for the sole purpose of making itself eligi-
ble for EA." In light of later methods of narrowing eligibility, this DPW policy deci-
sion is remarkably open.
The hotel count continued to rise throughout 1985 and 1986, fueled by the increas-
ing costs of Massachusetts housing. As it appears that homeless families in hotels were
particularly bad for public relations, as opposed to homeless families in shelters, state
officials made enormous efforts to reduce reliance on state-paid motels by developing
a large network of private, nonprofit family shelters. Somehow, families in shelters
seemed to signify homelessness less than families placed in motels. The number of
shelters boomed, growing from two state-subsidized programs at the start of the 1980s
to more than one hundred— excluding those for battered women— by the decade's
close. Administration publications detailed the state's accomplishments in combating
homelessness through its great expansion of shelter programs.
The shelter count reached its peak in 1988, with more than 500 families in family
shelters and more than 700 in state-financed motels. Late in 1987, DPW announced
a set of regulations that instituted a much more rigid system of admission to shelter
and contained provisions allowing the department to toss families out of shelters.
Significantly, the EA rules, which were circulated in late 1987 and became final in
the winter of 1988, allowed the department to
• devise a set list of reasons for homelessness. It included natural disaster, evic-
tion, abuse, overcrowding, and government action, namely, condemnation of
buildings.
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•place families in a shelter within twenty miles of their community, or a contiguous
community, of origin. This meant that homeless families from Boston were placed
in shelters in communities like Lowell, Fall River, Taunton, Attleboro, New Bed-
ford, Maiden, Peabody, and Saugus, which some not only had never heard of, but
could not find their way to them via public or private transportation.
investigate whether a family had feasible, alternative accommodations with a
friend or relative. DPW caseworkers often telephoned lists of persons provided
by the homeless families. One mother contacted MCH, complaining that she
and her children had been placed with a high school friend with whom she had
not been in touch for a decade!
require a client to sign a "contract" prior to provision of shelter. This quasi-
legalistic document, detailing a prospective shelter guest's responsibilities and
agreement to abide by vaguely stated shelter rules, included a blanket autho-
rization waiving the family's right to privacy. This waiver authorized the wel-
fare department to share information about the homeless family with any
other agency of state government.
The effect of these conditions varied from local office to local office. While one
had to be homeless for the right reasons to get shelter, documentation requirements
were interpreted differently by different DPW workers. A caseworker uninterested
in or opposed to providing shelter could use various departmental rules to effec-
tively bar families from it. In a number of instances reported to MCH staffer Leslie
Lawrence, DPW workers informed clients that their names would be put on a wait-
ing list for shelter— a virtual stalling tactic, since shelter would never materialize.
As the regulations were implemented, problems in gaining entry to temporary
shelter began to crop up. Correspondence to the department regarding shelter
access included a variety of case examples, including clients who were told that
"there's no such thing as shelter any longer"; clients who were instructed to go to
shelters twenty miles away, without transportation, or in one instance, directions
being provided; clients who were forced to wait upward of four hours before being
given an application for shelter; and women with children being placed in "line-up"
barracks shelters for single adults.
Ms. P. and her two-day-old newborn child requested emergency shelter as her land-
lord has a valid execution from the court, and is ready to evict her. The worker told
her that before she could be placed, the Department would need written state-
ments from her relatives explaining why she could not stay with them, as well as
written proof that she had applied for accommodations at the local shelter.
Ms. C. [then asked her DPW worker], "What are you supposed to do for a roof
over your head?" The worker responded, "You can spend the weekend at Long
Island [a barracks-style shelter for homeless adults] and get back in touch on
Monday." Hearing this, Ms. C. left. Ms. C. could not bring herself to take her
three babies to Long Island. 13
Homeless families already in crisis not infrequently— and not unsurprisingly—
gave up in the face of these obstacles. Advocates had the experience of working with
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families who had made repeated tries for shelter, and succeeded only when courage
and desperation peaked.
As Figure 1 shows, the number of sheltered families reached its peak in late 1988
after months of increases, with more than 1,250 families sheltered by the common-
wealth each night, the majority in state-paid hotels/motels. A typical seasonal
decline occurred in December, as families stayed out of— or left— shelters during
the holidays.
The Beginning of the End of Access to Shelter
In the spring of 1989, state officials began a new regulatory drafting process, which
ended in the fall of that year. These regulations, still in place, marked the new era of
highly restricted access to shelter. Advocates began to hear complaints of families
unable to penetrate the emergency shelter gate and of families once again sleeping
in cars, hallways, and hospital emergency rooms— situations that had all but disap-
peared during most of the 1980s. Shelters saw a rapid decline in the number of
referrals made to them by local welfare offices. 14 The hotels and motels began to
empty out. Families who did manage to squeeze into shelters told of spending an
average eight months in them.
The most dramatic changes were related to documenting the need for shelter, partic-
ularly for families who had stayed temporarily with friends or families. Rather than a
self-declaration as to the need and reason for shelter, DPW required documentation to
an unprecedented degree. Families were forced to prove that not only were they home-
less for the right reasons, but that they had no feasible, alternative housing. For exam-
ple, the commonwealth decided that any apartment costing more than 100 percent of a
household's Aid to Families with Dependent Children grant, as well as substantial health
code violations, was in fact a feasible, alternative housing option. Only when a house-
hold was ordered closed by the local board of health— the municipal agency charged
with enforcing the health code— or a court would DPW agree to shelter the family.
Most controversial was the new rule that a family forced to leave a doubled-up sit-
uation needed verification from the Department of Social Services (DSS) that it was
in fact necessary to leave. Over the past decade, MCH and its members repeatedly
found that homeless families stayed temporarily with friends or relatives for varying
lengths of time prior to a stay in a state-financed hotel or shelter. The term "dou-
bling up" applies to a second, homeless, family moving into the home of a primary,
or "host," tenant. Doubling up was considered a feasible, alternative accommoda-
tion by DPW. Such circumstances become untenable for a wide range of reasons,
including severe overcrowding; threats by the primary tenant's landlord to evict both
families from the apartment if the doubled-up family failed to vacate; medical prob-
lems created for either the primary tenant or the homeless family as a result of the
overcrowding; mistreatment, sometimes to the point of physical violence, by the pri-
mary tenant; and the more mundane stresses and strains of two households— with
differing styles of parenting, housekeeping, cooking, and maintaining household
finances— attempting to coexist in living space meant only for one.
Doubling up as a means to forestall placement in state-supported shelters and
hotels has been so commonplace, in fact, that an informal survey of residents of a
Boston family shelter found that the average time spent living in other people's
housing was over one year prior to entrance into a shelter.
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The Department of Social Services developed an evaluation of doubled-up families
which included a written assessment that there existed an imminent threat to the health
and safety of the homeless children. If the DSS finds that there is no such threat, the
homeless family is not deemed eligible for emergency shelter. The DSS assessment
includes an evaluation of medical problems, protective risks, behavioral/emotional/
development issues, "ability to perform parental duties," physical space, and school
performance.
The new DSS assessment proved to be an effective tool in reducing the number of
homeless families deemed eligible for shelter.
Since November 1, 1989, when the new Emergency Assistance policy was imple-
mented, we [the Department of Public Welfare] have experienced an 18% reduc-
tion in the number of homeless families needing shelter. The caseload has been
reduced from 1,067 to 872. The greatest reduction has been in the number of
families who have to be temporarily sheltered in hotels/motels. The Department
only uses these facilities when shelter space is not available. 15 [Italics added]
Of course, it was not that fewer families needed shelter, but rather that the
department provided shelter to a reduced number of households, using a very effec-
tive screening tool: an assessment by the state's child protection agency. An internal
draft memo from the DPW noted that "DSS Assessments have resulted in almost
250 families remaining in their current housing situation since November 1, and not
entering the emergency sheltering system . . . General consensus is that the DSS
component is of great value to the new FY90 delivery system." 16
Why should an assessment by the Department of Social Services be such an obstacle
for families seeking shelter? Advocates found that a number of factors played a part.
•
•
The DSS assessment process requires that a state worker visit the home of the
friend or relative, where the homeless family is living. Thus, the host family,
who is charitably providing a shelter, is subjected to the scrutiny of a state
agency. This occurs despite the fact that the host family is not seeking any
assistance from the Commonwealth. Not surprisingly, host families have
objected to such an examination.
In devising its assessment process, DPW chose a branch of state government,
DSS, that frequently frightens homeless families, for fear that an attempt
would be made by DSS to remove the children from the parents and place
them in foster care. Indeed, assessments have triggered this process, both for
host and guest families. What began for some families as a request for shelter
ended in a custody battle with the state.
For some households in crisis and already disorganized, the additional step of
seeking and participating in a DSS assessment proves to be a step too much.
For some DPW workers, the additional layer of bureaucracy required by an
assessment provides a disincentive to understaffed welfare offices in offering
shelter. A DPW worker told an MCH member that she didn't want to make a
referral for a DSS assessment, because if it indicated an imminent threat to
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health or safety, she would be forced to place the family in shelter. The DPW
worker avoided the dilemma by refusing to make the referral.
• The standards by which DSS performs its assessments are inherently flawed.
MCH staff have seen instances in which DSS decided that there was no threat
to a homeless family's health or safety despite other evidence to the contrary,
such as a doctor's certificate that the mother's health and that of her unborn
baby were in jeopardy because of the sleeping arrangements of a doubled-up
situation. Moreover, DSS has taken the position that a decision by a host
family to kick out a homeless family does not constitute a threat to health or
safety. Thus, MCH staff have examined DSS assessments which note that a
homeless family must vacate its current refuge in two days, yet concurrently
conclude that no threat to health or safety exists.
Overall, the routine, but informal, denials of shelter experienced for years by
homeless families and their advocates became in 1989 an organizing system of rejec-
tion that left many families stranded.
The mission of providing emergency services to homeless families succeeded for most
of the 1980s as Massachusetts created a sheltering system that provided temporary
respite for essentially all homeless parents with children in need. At the close of the
decade— 1989, 1990, 1991— this changed. Despite a state statute that mandated
the commonwealth's responsibility to shelter homeless families, an increasingly com-
plex and burdensome regulatory system to manage the rising numbers of homeless
emerged in the late 1980s. The state's efforts to provide temporary, rather than per-
manent, solutions to homelessness doomed their efforts from the start and ensured
that the only means by which progress— as measured by the number of families in
state-supported shelters and hotels— would be made would be through limiting the
inflow of homeless families into shelter. The recent round of budget cuts, decimating
the only state program which addressed the rent-income gap for homeless and poor
families, portends a state response to homelessness that falls even further from a real
solution than those pursued during the last decade. This lack of willingness to grapple
with the economic causes and solutions of homelessness will only lead the common-
wealth into even more draconian methods of governing who is in need.
Of all the ways to "end" homelessness, redefining a homeless family as not home-
less must certainly qualify as one of the most inventive. It is also a strategy that favors
short-term savings over longer-term ones, both in terms of government spending and
the toll on the household. The problem of homelessness has become an intractable one
only in that the solutions sought are limited in perspective. The economics of homeless-
ness are simple enough— incomes that fall far behind the cost of housing— to make
our collective lack of action inexcusable. It's time to focus on assistance for homeless
families rather than wishing— or defining— them away. ^
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